Selective loss of biographical knowledge
There are numerous reports in the literature of patients who fail to provide information about people but nonetheless give detailed descriptions of objects and animals. Preserved knowledge of common noun categories has been demonstrated in tests of confrontation naming (Warrington and McCarthy, 1987; Ellis et al., 1989; Evans et al., 1995; Van der Linden et al., 1995; Kartsounis and Shallice, 1996; Verstichel et al., 1996; Kroll et al., 1997; Mackenzie Ross and Hodges, 1997; Semenza et al., 1998; Kitchener and Hodges, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000) , fluency (Stracciari et al., 1994; Verstichel et al., 1996; Kroll et al., 1997; Hodges and Graham, 1998; Kitchener and Hodges, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000) , spoken and picture-word matching (e.g. Warrington and McCarthy, 1987; Kay and Hanley, 1999; Kitchener and Hodges, 1999) , semantic association (e.g. Hodges and Graham, 1998; Kay and Hanley, 1999) and category membership (e.g. Ellis et al., 1989; Kitchener and Hodges, 1999; Gentileschi et al., 2001) . In the case of biographical knowledge, impairment has been demonstrated in face naming (Ellis et al., 1989; Hanley et al., 1989; Evans et al., 1995; Kartsounis and Shallice, 1996; Semenza et al., 1998; Miceli et al., 2000) , face/name recognition and identification (e.g. Warrington and McCarthy, 1987; Ellis et al., 1989; Hanley et al., 1989; de Haan et al., 1991; Evans et al., 1995; Van der Linden et al., 1995; Eslinger et al., 1996; Kitchener and Hodges, 1999; Gentileschi et al., 2001) , semantic association (e.g. Kay and Hanley, 1999) , temporal judgements (e.g. Warrington and McCarthy, 1988; Stracciari et al., 1994; Eslinger et al., 1996; Kroll et al., 1997; Mackenzie Ross and Hodges, 1997; Hodges and Graham, 1998) , naming from definition (e.g. Verstichel et al., 1996; Semenza et al., 1998) and face-name matching (e.g. Warrington and McCarthy, 1987; de Haan et al., 1991; Kay and Hanley, 1999; Miceli Calabrese et al. (1996) Not identified ϫ ϫ ϫ √ (not specified) de Haan et al. (1991) ME √ √ (F, N) √ √ (O, N) Ellis et al. (1989) KS √ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (O, N) Eslinger et al. (1996) EK, DR ϫ √ (F, N) √ √ (O, N, T) Evans et al. (1995) VH √ √ (F) ϫ √ (O, N, FR) Kitchener and Hodges (1999) VH ϫ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (N, FR) Gentileschi et al. (2001) Emma √ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (N, FR) Haslam et al. (2001) TG ϫ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (O, N) Hanley et al. (1989) BD √ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (O, N) Kay and Hanley (1999) BD ϫ ϫ √ √ (O, N) Hodges and Graham (1998) DM ϫ √ (N) ϫ √ (FR) Hodges and McCarthy (1993) PS ϫ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (T, N, FR) Incisa della Rochetta et al. (1998) TM ϫ ϫ ϫ √ (n, N) Kartsounis and Shallice (1996) ABR √ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (O, N) Kay and Hanley (2002) ML ϫ √ (F) √ √ (O, N, SA) Kroll et al. (1997) AA, BB, CC ϫ ϫ ϫ √ (O, N, FR) Lyons et al. (2002) FH ϫ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (O, N, SA) Mackenzie Ross and Hodges (1997) ES ϫ ϫ ϫ √ (N, FR) Miceli et al. (2000) APA √ ϫ ϫ √ (O, n, N, D/A, FR) Reinvang and Gjerstad (1998) DH ϫ √ (N) ϫ √ (FR) Semenza et al. (1998) CB ϫ √ (F) √ √ (N, FR) Stracciari et al. (1994) ML ϫ √ (F) ϫ √ (not specified) Van der Linden et al. (1996) AC √ √ (F) ϫ √ (O, n, N) Van der Linden et al. (1995) GB √ √ (F, N) ϫ √ (O, n, N) Van Lancker and Klein (1990) S1-S4 √ ϫ √ ϫ Verstichel et al. (1996) DEL ϫ √ (F, N) √ √ (O, N, FR) Warrington and McCarthy (1988) RFR √ √ (F, N) √ √ (N, T) McCarthy and Warrington (1992) RFR ϫ √ (N) ϫ √ (N, T) Warrington and McCarthy (1987) YOT ϫ ϫ √ ϫ a Expression, unfamiliar match, gender, age. F, face; N, name; O, occupation; n, nationality; D/A, dead/alive; T, temporal judgement; SA, semantic association; FR, free recall.
et al., 2000) . Sometimes, examination of face perception and discrimination (e.g. analysis of features and expression) is included to rule out involvement of early visual processes used in structural encoding (e.g. Ellis et al., 1989; Hanley et al., 1989; Van der Linden et al., 1995; Gentileschi et al., 2001) . Clearly, a variety of tests have been used to assess biographical knowledge and, given this, one might conclude that comparison between these studies is limited. Yet the types of question researchers use to probe biographical knowledge are very similar. For instance, in the case of famous person identification, researchers typically probe knowledge about occupation (e.g. Hodges and McCarthy, 1993; Van der Linden et al., 1995; Eslinger et al., 1996; Kartsounis and Shallice, 1996; Verstichel et al., 1996) and name (e.g. McCarthy and Warrington, 1992; Calabrese et al., 1996; Semenza et al., 1998; Kay and Hanley, 1999; Kitchener and Hodges, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000) , and sometimes ask questions pertaining to nationality (e.g. Van der Linden et al., 1995 or whether a person is alive or dead (e.g. Ellis et al., 1989 ) (see Table 1 for a list of biographical knowledge tests employed in particular studies). These questions are clearly appropriate in the context of probing biographical knowledge. Unfortunately, as Table 1 shows, these questions are not asked consistently. Furthermore, the type of task used to tap this knowledge differs and can involve spontaneous recall, forced choice recognition, matching or cued recall.
Reliance on spontaneous recall is particularly problematic. In this case, any omission (involving a person's nationality, for example) may not necessarily reflect impaired knowledge. Hence, these types of general questions or statements are best avoided if meaningful comparisons between studies are to be made.
As highlighted earlier, most studies focus on assessment of famous person knowledge (e.g. Evans et al., 1995; Semenza et al., 1998; Kay and Hanley, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000) . Relatively few have examined autobiographical personspecific knowledge (i.e. information about people known personally to the patient) and even fewer have done so systematically through the use of equivalent tasks. When an attempt has been made to equate tasks, it is possible to compare biographical performance in personal and public domains directly. In their investigation of VH, for example, Kitchener and Hodges (1999) found that knowledge about personally familiar people was considerably better preserved than that of famous people. A similar pattern of superior knowledge in the autobiographical domain is reported for APA (Miceli et al., 2000) and Emma (Gentileschi et al., 2001 ). However, in other studies, comparison of the two types of biographical information is more difficult as equivalent tests were not used. For instance, in the Kroll et al. (1997) study, it is unclear whether personal domain knowledge actually included that of people, as testing was based on questions about personally experienced events rather than personally familiar people. While reference to people is made occasionally when recalling events, specific questions relevant to person identification (involving knowledge about occupation and country of origin, for instance) are not asked, making it difficult to compare results obtained on an autobiographical knowledge test of this nature with one of famous face identification. Similarly, despite an extensive examination of knowledge for famous people in Ellis et al.'s (1989) study, only descriptive data about personally familiar people were reported, which are less easy to verify objectively.
With these caveats, it appears that knowledge for personally familiar people is either better preserved than that for famous people, or at least equally impaired in such studies. This pattern is also supported by the retrograde amnesia literature in which examination of public and autobiographical knowledge has been extended to include identification of both personally familiar and famous people (e.g. Reinvang and Gjerstad, 1998) . While there are several reports of impaired autobiographical relative to public knowledge in the literature (e.g. Stracciari et al., 1994; Calabrese et al., 1996; Van der Linden et al., 1996; Mackenzie Ross and Hodges, 1997) , examination has again focused on personally experienced events and not personally relevant people. Hence, no conclusions can be drawn about knowledge of personally familiar people from these studies. There is one exception to this general pattern. Hodges and McCarthy (1993) report a pattern of preserved public relative to autobiographical personspecific knowledge in their patient, PS. In this case, there was evidence of a temporal gradient in autobiographical recall, with memories from the distant past preserved relative to those from the recent past. Of note was his inability to identify photographs of familiar people (only 6/17 correctly recognized), even those of 'long-standing friends'. This latter problem is particularly interesting given that one might predict old adult friends to be at least familiar despite the fact that they may look older than PS remembered. Of course, this would depend on PS's last available representation of particular friends. A difference of say 10 years, between PS's memory and the actual photograph, may not affect recognition if his last available mental representation was for a person in their 30s. However, the same time difference may influence recognition if PS's representation was of a person in their teens. Without additional information, including any possible associations between the six people he could identify, it is difficult to clarify what appears to be an unexpected result. Overall then, there is little evidence to suggest that biographical and autobiographical semantic knowledge are separable: autobiographical knowledge may simply be relatively better preserved due to the greater familiarity with, and emotional richness of, information acquired through personal experience [which may mean that it is distributed or 'multi-modal' in nature; see Kitchener and Hodges (1999) for a discussion].
The difference between personally experienced events and knowledge about personally relevant people deserves elaboration. As noted above, these two aspects of autobiographical knowledge may be associated in some situations.
Many past events involve personally familiar people and the information acquired during these episodes may contribute to one's knowledge about these people. What does this mean about the representation of autobiographical person-specific and event-specific knowledge? There is still much to be learned. Few researchers have included tests examining identification of personally familiar people when investigating knowledge of autobiographical events. When this has been conducted (e.g. Hodges and McCarthy, 1993) , impairment in both domains has been found, suggesting the two problems may be associated, but whether this occurs in all patients presenting with impaired knowledge of personal events is unknown.
Another observation reported in patients with selective loss of biographical knowledge is an associated impairment of knowledge for other unique entities, including countries and geographical landmarks (e.g. Statue of Liberty, Eiffel Tower). For example, Gentileschi et al.'s (2001) patient, Emma, failed to access information not only concerning people but also famous buildings. In addition to an impairment in biographical knowledge, ABR (Kartsounis and Shallice, 1996) also failed to provide identifying information about famous landmarks in the visual modality. These observations have been used to suggest that the pattern of biographical knowledge loss in patients involves more widespread knowledge about unique instances, of which people, country and proper name categories are merely examples. This may be a reasonable explanation if exemplar knowledge was impaired in all patients and in all categories. However, this does not appear to be the case. VH (Evans et al., 1995) , for example, while unable to provide information about people, could identify famous landmarks. Verstichel et al. (1996) found that their patient, DEL, was accurate in the identification of country names but not of people. GB (Van der Linden et al., 1995) , while accurate in identifying countries and cars, could not identify people.
These findings are difficult to interpret. It is not clear, for instance, why some aspects of exemplar knowledge are impaired whilst others are preserved. An explanation based on impaired comprehension of unique exemplars alone is not sufficient to explain the pattern of findings. The pattern of impairment observed to date seems to suggest an associative, rather than dissociative, relationship between people and other unique entities. A deficit in biographical knowledge may occur together with impairment of some other singular entities, but there are no reports of patients presenting with impaired knowledge of all classes of singular entity. Either these patients do not exist or they have not been identified because the examination of exemplar knowledge has not been sufficiently thorough. The latter is a legitimate criticism. Most of the work to date has focused on knowledge concerning famous buildings or landmarks (e.g. Miceli et al., 2000) . One exception is Ellis et al.'s (1989) study which included examination of knowledge about famous animals, buildings and product names in addition to that concerning people. They found that knowledge in all these classes was impaired. At this stage we can only encourage more studies of this type to obtain clarification of the relationship between biographical and other exemplar knowledge.
Several researchers report a more selective pattern of impairment in biographical knowledge. In these cases, the deficit appears restricted to certain aspects of biographical knowledge affecting information acquired at a particular time or information specific to modality. There are reports of temporal gradients in the loss of person-specific knowledge in patients with Alzheimer's disease (Green and Hodges, 1996) and Korsakoff's syndrome (e.g. Kopelman, 1991) . The pattern of memory loss in KS (Ellis et al., 1989) appears to suggest a temporal gradient, at least in the case of her autobiographical knowledge concerning people. KS is described as providing more detailed information about people she encountered in her childhood (e.g. teachers, school friends, and neighbours) than those encountered in the context of work. The authors tentatively suggest some sparing of memories for people from her early life, although it is not clear whether her difficulties with people encountered recently can be explained by the onset of her epilepsy (as the observations reported in the context of a recent visit to a specialist seem to suggest). In contrast, a reverse temporal gradient in biographical knowledge has been reported in several patients with semantic dementia. This was investigated most thoroughly in patient DM (Hodges and Graham, 1998) . His knowledge about currently famous people was superior to that for people famous in previous decades (i.e. 1950s, 1980s and early 1990s) .
While these reports of temporal gradients are clinically interesting, they are not present in all patients (e.g. VC: Cipolotti et al., 2001 ; ES: Mackenzie Ross and Hodges, 1997; RFR: Warrington and McCarthy, 1988; McCarthy and Warrington, 1992) and, in fact, may not be particularly helpful in developing our understanding of biographical knowledge representation. Temporal gradients, irrespective of their presentation (i.e. standard or reverse), need not be specific to biographical knowledge as they can emerge when recalling other personal semantic details (such as one's school or address), events (e.g. Hodges and McCarthy, 1993) and professional knowledge [see Butters' (1984) description of PZ]. Hence, it appears that temporal organization can be an important feature in the representation of knowledge in general rather than being specific to particular categories or domains.
More controversial in relation to biographical representation is evidence of modality-specific impairments. Several patients have been reported who show better access to biographical knowledge in one modality when compared with that of another. Thus, better name knowledge compared with face knowledge is evident in KS (Ellis et al., 1989) , DR (Eslinger et al., 1996) , VH (Evans et al., 1995) , TG (Haslam et al., 2001) , ABR (Kartsounis and Shallice, 1996) , CB (Semenza et al., 1998) , GB (Van der Linden et al., 1995) and possibly in the case of RFR (McCarthy and Warrington, 1992 ; see the results of Experiment II). It is tempting to explain this pattern as a particular form of prosopagnosia and this was certainly the case for one patient, VH. However, this may not account for findings in other patients (e.g. KS and TG) who showed only mild differences, if any, in face and name familiarity judgements. There are also patients, albeit fewer in number, who present with the reverse pattern. Superior knowledge in response to face cues has been reported in DEL (Verstichel et al., 1996) , TM (Incisa della Rochetta et al., 1998) and EK (Eslinger et al., 1996) . This pattern has been reported to be inconsistent with current models of person recognition that propose equal access to biographical knowledge regardless of modality (i.e. face, name or voice; e.g. Burton et al., 1990) .
To explain this inconsistency, Eslinger et al. (1996) suggested that there may be modality-specific stores of biographical knowledge-one activated in response to faces and another in response to names. This claim was based on evidence of a double dissociation in knowledge, with one patient, EK, showing superior knowledge in the 'face' modality and the other patient, DR, showing superior knowledge in the 'name' modality. Unfortunately, the evidence provided for one patient, EK, is particularly unconvincing as her familiarity with items presented in the impaired (i.e. 'name') modality was very low (i.e. 0.36/6). Hence, her deficit in name-associated knowledge may be explained by a problem at a stage prior to semantic processing and if this is the case, she does not represent the reverse dissociation as claimed by the researchers. Is this true for the two remaining patients (i.e. DEL and TM)? If it was, we could account for modalityspecific differences in terms of task difficulty (i.e. that faces are more difficult to process than names). However, results from DEL (Verstichel et al., 1996) cannot be dismissed so easily. Unlike EK, he was familiar with the majority of famous names that he failed to identify. For instance, while DEL was familiar with all the famous personalities presented in the two modalities (i.e. a sample of 24 items), his accuracy in providing biographical information differed. Although able to provide semantic details for all the faces, accuracy fell to 58% in the case of names.
There is an alternative explanation for modality-specific differences that does not rely on the existence of dual semantic systems. It is possible that the connections between modality-specific recognition units (e.g. faces, names and voices) and semantic representations can be damaged resulting in weaker connections which allow only superficial access to biographical knowledge. This notion is based on evidence of a differentiation in the amount of biographical information that non-impaired controls can access in response to famous faces and voices (Hanley et al., 1998; Hanley and Turner, 2000) , with information provided in response to the former cue better than that provided in response to the latter cue. Such an explanation could account for superior knowledge in any modality. A weak connection between the face recognition units and person-specific semantics could result in fewer details recalled in response to face cues. Similarly, a weak connection between name recognition units and person-specific semantics could result in fewer details recalled in response to name cues. Unfortunately, it is not obvious how one can distinguish between these accounts, as the existing data could be explained by either dual semantic systems or a weak connection. Theoretical development of both positions is required if we are to overcome this stalemate.
The issue of modality-specific systems, while only recently encountered in work on the representation of biographical knowledge, has been debated in the general semantic memory literature for some time. Researchers have used evidence of impaired word relative to picture knowledge (e.g. Chertkow et al., 1992; Lauro-Grotto et al., 1997) to argue in favour of single or multiple stores of semantic knowledge. Specifically, it has been proposed that the presence of selective impairment results from either deficient access to a single amodal store of semantic knowledge (e.g. Caramazza et al., 1990) or damage to a modality-specific subsystem (e.g. Shallice, 1988) . This debate, like that in the biographical knowledge literature, has not reached a satisfactory conclusion.
Selective preservation of biographical knowledge
There are relatively few pure cases of preserved personspecific knowledge in the context of a general impairment of semantic memory. In several cases where such a claim has been made, there is either evidence of additional preservation of some common noun categories or questions about the status of biographical knowledge preservation. For instance, in the case of YOT (Warrington and McCarthy, 1987) , it was claimed that knowledge about famous people was selectively spared, despite the fact that her knowledge of common noun categories varied. Knowledge about flowers, animals and some man-made objects was preserved, but that for musical instruments and furniture was impaired. Furthermore, given the severity of YOT's dysphasia, semantic knowledge was tested by using matching-to-sample tasks. It has been argued that these face-name judgements can be made in the absence of comprehension, by using links between the face recognition units and person identity nodes (PINs), for example (Valentine et al., 1996; Kay and Hanley, 2002) . Similar difficulties with interpretation, resulting from the use of matching-to-sample tasks, arise in the Van Lancker and Klein (1990) study. Hence, these cases may not in fact represent selective preservation of person-specific knowledge.
We are left then with two patients-FH (Lyons et al., 2002) and ML -who appear to show the reverse dissociation in which person-specific knowledge is preserved relative to that for common nouns. In the case of FH, comprehension of objects he could not name was impaired on a variety of tasks, including synonym matching and semantic association. This contrasts with his performance in a test of famous face and name identification which was within the normal range. To investigate biographical knowledge further, Lyons et al. also administered a comprehension test for people equivalent to the Pyramids and Palm Trees Test. This test, the 'Bogart and Bacall Test' , involves written presentation of three famous names-a target and two stimulus names. The participant is required to choose which of the two stimulus names has a stronger connection with the target. FH performed normally on this test, but was impaired on a similar task with common nouns. While the associative relationship between two objects and two people may not be comparable in these tasks, the study represents one of the few attempts to control for the type of task employed.
A similar profile is reported in ML , who also had no difficulty accessing biographical information about people (e.g. in semantic association) when presented with both faces and names. Yet her performance in picture and word comprehension and association tests (objects and animals) was impaired. As the authors suggest, ML and FH appear to provide the clearest examples of the reverse dissociation in which biographical knowledge is selectively preserved.
None of these cases explores the status of knowledge of personally familiar people. Based on the existing literature, it could be assumed that autobiographical knowledge for people would be preserved given that it is usually not impaired in isolation. Of course, these investigations are more involved and require the development of materials for each individual case. Nonetheless, if we are to improve our understanding of the nature of the relationship between public and autobiographical knowledge, then the status of autobiographical knowledge warrants further investigation in such cases. A similar criticism could be made of the relative lack of data concerning knowledge for other classes of 'singular objects'. FH, while capable of accessing knowledge concerning famous people, failed to provide detailed semantic information about geographical features. How would he have performed with other categories such as famous animals, masterpieces or product names? We are not currently in a position to judge.
Explaining the pattern of loss and preservation
As already noted, evidence of selective loss and selective preservation of biographical knowledge has been used by some researchers to posit a separate system for processing information about people Hanley, 1999, 2002; Miceli et al., 2000; Gentileschi et al., 2001; Lyons et al., 2002) , as proposed in early and current models of face processing (e.g. Bruce and Young, 1986; Burton et al., 1990; Valentine et al., 1996) . Consistent with this view, it has also been suggested that category-specific representation, involving biographical knowledge among other classes, such as animals and food, has evolutionary significance (Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Kay and Hanley, 1999; Miceli et al., 2000) . However, while presenting a superficially plausible account, this view does not, by itself, inform on the nature of the organization and structure of semantic memory and hence will not be elaborated here [although see Shelton and Caramazza (2001) for an attempt to elaborate the account according to the Organised Unitary Conceptual Hypothesis (OUCH)]. Much of the theoretical development in biographical knowledge representation has relied on existing accounts of semantic memory structure. In particular, researchers have focused on distinctions between living and non-living, as well as token and type categories.
Work on the organization of conceptual knowledge of 'living' and 'man-made' exemplars has progressed largely independently of that concerning people and, hence, it is not surprising that investigations of living and non-living knowledge categories have rarely included tests of personspecific knowledge. One recently elaborated theory focusing on the living/non-living distinction is offered by Moss (1997, 2001 ). These researchers argue that semantic concepts are distributed in nature, with those sharing many features, some highly correlated (i.e. features which would be expected to co-occur, such as eyes and ears and legs), being represented closely together. Applying this structure, members of the 'living' categories will tend to cluster together in semantic space, while members of the 'manmade' categories will develop in less well-defined regions, as they tend to have fewer and less densely correlated properties. On this account, it is argued that there are no independent stores representing different categories of knowledge, but rather many overlapping regions in 'lumpy semantic space' (Tyler and Moss, 2001) .
Of more importance to the present discussion is how the living/non-living distinction fares in explaining selective impairment in person-specific knowledge? In one sense, person-specific information can be regarded as another category of living things, as it comprises intercorrelated features that are shared with other animal categories-specifically, mammals. However, in the few cases where the distinction was explored in patients with selective loss or preservation of biographical knowledge, no association was found with knowledge of living things. Warrington and McCarthy (1987) applied the living/non-living distinction to explain the performance of YOT whose knowledge for famous people, flowers and animals was preserved relative to knowledge for furniture, musical instruments and objects; that is, she appeared to show preservation of the living category and impairment of the non-living. But the distinction is not as clear as these authors suggest, given that YOT's knowledge of some man-made objects, buildings and cities was preserved. Obviously, none of these classes fits neatly into the category of living things. Hanley et al.'s (1989) patient BD was originally described as having a deficit of biographical knowledge which involved a more general impairment of living things (affecting breeds of dog and types of flower). This was challenged by Kay and Hanley (1999) who conducted additional tests with BD to examine knowledge for living and non-living items and found no difference in performance. Another patient, ML , showed preserved knowledge of people but was impaired in her comprehension of both living and non-living things. Overall, the existing evidence, albeit limited, does not appear to support a living/non-living distinction in relation to biographical knowledge. Shared category similarities (eyes, noses, legs), which form the foundation of any theory of living and non-living category distinctions, are clearly not as essential in representing biographical knowledge as are individual differences between people across a range of dimensions (i.e. why particular individuals are known and how they are known).
Can other related theories of general conceptual knowledge be applied to person-specific knowledge? One influential theory suggests that knowledge of animals, plants and manmade objects, for example, is organized according to their distribution of sensory and functional properties within semantic memory (e.g. Warrington and Shallice, 1984; Warrington and McCarthy, 1987) . Thus, man-made objects such as hammers and axes are more reliably distinguished on the basis of their functional, rather than their perceptual features, while living things such as lions and tigers are principally differentiated on the basis of their perceptual features. Based on this theory, one might predict that people, like members of other 'living' categories, are differentiated on the basis of their perceptual features. However, such an analysis is clearly superficial given that people are often distinguished on the basis of many attributes (e.g. occupation and country of origin, for instance) and not primarily on perceptual features alone (e.g. hair colour and height).
Recently, research has focused on the unique and arbitrary nature of associations between people and some of their attributes to explain difficulties in name production. The most relevant to the current discussion is the token/type distinction as it is based on a differentiation between knowledge for single or unique entities (i.e. tokens), of which people are one example, and that for categories (i.e. types) (Jackendoff, 1986 (Jackendoff, , 1987 . Although knowledge of concepts such as dogs or kitchen utensils is considered an example of a category type, they may acquire the status of 'token' when reference is made to 'my dog' or 'my mug'. This notion of a 'token' appears to be similar to that proposed by Burton et al. (1990) in their interactive activation (IAC) model of face processing. In the IAC model, access to biographical knowledge occurs through a single link between the PINs, believed to contain representations (or possibly 'tokens') for all familiar people, and identity-specific semantics. One might ask whether the selective loss of biographical knowledge, for example, reflects damage to a single 'exemplar semantic' system (Gentileschi et al., 2001 ) containing information about all unique entities (which would include product names, famous animals, people and buildings). As noted earlier, the evidence does not support this view. Some classes of exemplar knowledge are affected in some patients with biographical knowledge impairment (e.g. Kartsounis and Shallice, 1996; Gentileschi et al., 2001) , but the profile is neither consistent nor does it appear to affect exemplar knowledge in its entirety. The latter point can be debated, but not without more data concerning the status of exemplar knowledge in patients with selective loss and preservation of biographical knowledge. The separation of person-specific knowledge from other classes of exemplar knowledge is consistent with the notion of PINs being specific to people. There is no evidence to suggest that access to a PIN-like structure is required in order to recall knowledge about a famous landmark such as the Eiffel Tower. This distinction, however, is not made in the token/type theory where tokens can be applied to landmarks, names of animals (e.g. rover) or other unique entities (Jackendoff, 1987) .
An important additional feature of token relationships, and particularly of those to do with autobiographical and biographical knowledge of people, is their emotional component. Knowledge concerning 'my best friend', 'the politician that I loathe', and 'my favourite mug that X gave me' is more typical of token, as opposed to type, relationships. Such differences may be reflected in the structure and organization of these relationships in semantic memory and may indicate separate functional and neural systems. On the other hand, the 'lumpy' semantic space proposed by Caramazza et al. (1990) and Tyler and Moss (2001) may represent domains of knowledge that vary along a number of dimensions which include not only concrete properties like shape, colour and function, but also abstract properties such as emotional content, which are particularly important for the semantic identification of people.
Attempts have been made to localize person-specific knowledge systems in the brain. It has been suggested, for example, that biographical knowledge impairment is associated with damage to the right temporal lobe (e.g. Ellis et al., 1989; Hanley et al., 1989; Evans et al., 1995) . Yet there is evidence of biographical impairment in patients with damage confined largely to the left hemisphere (e.g. Hodges and Graham, 1998; Semenza et al., 1998; Miceli et al., 2000) . Eslinger et al.'s (1996) data suggest a compromise-one which involves bilateral processing in the region of the medial and lateral occipitotemporal gyri. However, these researchers go further to suggest hemispheric specialization in processing information according to modality. They argue that the left hemisphere is involved in processing biographical associations with names and that the right hemisphere is involved in processing information associated with faces. Support for this distinction is provided by some patients (DR: Eslinger et al., 1996; TG: Haslam et al., 2001 ; TM: Incisa della Rochetta et al., 1998; VH: Hodges and Graham, 1998; DEL: Verstichel et al., 1996) but not by others in which the location of damage is either inconsistent with prediction or difficult to specify (EK: Eslinger et al., 1996 ; ABR: Kartsounis and Shallice, 1996; CB: Semenza et al., 1998; GB: Van der Linden et al., 1995) . Hence, predicting impairment of biographical knowledge on the basis of neuropathology alone remains risky.
This overview of theoretical explanations highlights the need for more rigorous data collection. There may be little support for the living/non-living distinction as an explanation of biographical knowledge impairment, but as few researchers have pursued this theory in their investigations there are as yet limited data that can be used to address the theory. We can deal with this problem simply by including tests that examine knowledge of other living categories when investigating biographical knowledge. The same can be said of the 'exemplar semantics' position. How can we either confirm or deny that biographical knowledge is part of an 'exemplar semantic' system if we do not include a sufficiently extensive investigation of all other exemplar categories? Access to appropriate data will allow us to evaluate these theoretical positions more effectively.
Future directions
Evidence is accumulating in support of the separation of person-specific knowledge from other categories of semantic knowledge. There are at least two cases of biographical knowledge preservation, compared with the numerous reports of biographical knowledge loss, and an increased awareness of these might result in additional cases emerging in the literature. More controversial is the organization within this biographical subsystem-whether it contains both public and personally relevant information, is combined with knowledge of other unique exemplars or separated further according to modality. Much of this can be addressed by ensuring more comprehensive examination of patients presenting with selective loss or sparing of biographical knowledge and in this context we suggest the following:
(1) Examine knowledge in multiple modalities to allow evaluation of issues concerning localization and modalityspecific impairments. (2) Include assessment of both famous and personally familiar people. While there is no evidence to date of a double dissociation between autobiographical and public knowledge, no firm conclusions can be drawn without additional data. (3) Extend examination of exemplar knowledge, which has often been limited to particular classes (e.g. geographical locations and landmarks). This will allow evaluation of associations with other kinds of 'token' or singular entities, should they exist. (4) Carry out appropriate measurement of person-specific semantic knowledge including identification tasks in addition to face-name matching. Similarly, equivalent tests of common and proper name comprehension should be used where possible to allow comparison.
A more comprehensive examination of biographical together with general semantic knowledge will help to clarify theory. For instance, a systematic examination of knowledge concerning all unique entities will allow evaluation of the 'exemplar semantic' position. Selective loss or preservation of all unique entities (including knowledge of people, buildings, masterpieces and countries, for example) would support the view that biographical knowledge may be represented within a dedicated 'exemplar semantic' system. Similarly, we can contribute to the debate concerning categorical representations in semantic memory by extending our examination to knowledge of living things. As noted earlier, this is rarely undertaken. Yet if biographical knowledge is just one example of the class of 'living things', then we should observe a pattern of either loss or preservation in both domains. We can also address questions concerning further divisions in biographical knowledge. Support for the modality-specific subsystems requires further evidence of impaired access to biographical knowledge in different modalities where recognition is preserved. Differentiation of personally familiar from famous person knowledge requires evidence of impairment in the former, which has not been demonstrated convincingly to date. All these questions can be addressed with additional appropriate data. For patients with hippocampal pathology, disagreement exists in the literature over whether retrograde amnesia is temporally limited or very extensive depending on whether the anatomical damage is restricted to this structure or also involves additional temporal cortex. We report a comprehensive assessment of retrograde and anterograde memory functions of a severely global amnesic patient (VC). We found that he presented with a remarkably extensive and basically ungraded retrograde amnesia. This impairment profoundly affected four decades preceding the onset of his amnesia and encompassed both non-personal and personal facts and events. VC also presented with a severe anterograde amnesia and a deficit in the acquisition of new semantic knowledge in the post-morbid period. Detailed MRI volumetric measurements revealed gross abnormalities in both hippocampi which were markedly shrunken. Of relevance to the debate on retrograde amnesia were the observations that the volumes of both entorhinal cortices and the remainder of both temporal lobes were normal. These data suggest that the hippocampus is critical not only for efficient encoding and hence normal recall of new information but also for the recall of episodic information acquired before the onset of amnesia. Our results are compatible with the view that retrograde amnesia is both extensive and ungraded when damage is limited to the hippocampus. It has been claimed that concepts in different semantic domains vary in the extent to which their meaning is comprised of different kinds of semantic information. Discussion has mainly focused around two kinds of conceptsliving things and man-made objects-arguing that functional information is central to the meaning of artefacts whereas perceptual information is more important for living things. This distinction has been important in accounting for patterns of semantic impairments following brain injury (Warrington and Shallice, 1984) . We suggest that functional information may be especially salient in the semantic representations of both living and non-living things. Our evidence for this claim comes from priming studies with normal subjects, and data from brain-damaged patients that support the claim that functional information is relatively spared following brain damage. The paper describes the case of a person (GB) without any clinical evidence of cerebral disease who showed a specific impairment in the retrieval of biographical information, including names, about famous people. This deficit appeared while GB scored normally in different long-term memory tasks, and in object naming tasks. Moreover, he showed no impairment in the structural encoding and the recognition of faces. His specific impairment is interpreted both in terms of Bruce and Young's (1986) functional model of person recognition and in terms of the more recent Burton et al. (1990) The performance of a severe amnesia patient (AC) was explored across two tasks designed to assess his public and personal semantic knowledge before and after the onset of his amnesia. On the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman et al., 1990 ), AC's ability to recollect specific personal episodes was severely impaired for the three time periods explored (childhood, early adulthood and contemporary life) but his general (semantic) personal knowledge was relatively preserved even for information that was acquired after the brain injury. The patient was also submitted to a famous people identification task. AC showed a relatively preserved ability to retrieve semantic information concerning famous people who came to fame before his accident. More importantly, AC acquired substantial knowledge about personalities who had become famous after the onset of his amnesia. In addition, the amount of knowledge that he acquired about politicians (a domain he knew particularly well before his accident) did not differ from that of control subjects. These data suggest that AC showed an impairment of episodic memory whereas semantic memory was relatively spared. They also confirm that new semantic learning in amnesics is particularly efficient if the to-be-acquired information is consistent with existing concepts.
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